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A PERMISSIVE WHEELING SCHEME:
QUALIFYING FACILITY TRANSMISSION

ACCESS STRATEGIES AND THE
ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) gave
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) a
broad mandate2 to help Qualifying Facilities3 (QFs) secure access to
wholesale transmission. However, section 210 of PURPA contains ambiguities regarding the FERC's role in regulating QF access;' indeed, the
Commission itself has recognized the ambiguities of this section.5
The utility merger activity of the last five years has spawned various
1. PURPA, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
2. PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 ("Mhe Commission shall prescribe. . such rules as
it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production.").
3. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(a) (1992). A QF is a small power production facility that: (1) does not
exceed 80 MW of power production, 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a) (1992), (2) uses as its primary energy
source "biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources, or any combination thereof, and
75 percent or more of the total energy input must be from these sources," 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(b)
(1992), and (3) is "not owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric
power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities or small power production facilities)," 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(a) (1992).
A QF may also be a "cogeneration facility, including any diesel and duel-fuel cogeneration
facility," 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(b) (1992), if it: (1) meets either of the operating and efficiency standards provided in § 292.205(a) or (b), and (2) meets the ownership criteria of § 292.206 described
above. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(b) (1992).
4. Section 210 was aimed at remedying two difficulties cogenerators or small power producers
encountered in market entry: 1) traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to trade with nontraditional utilities, and 2) financial burdens placed on such small facilities by federal and state authorities
discouraged cogeneration. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1982). A third difficulty
PURPA addressed was that equitable rates were not encouraged for consumers. Id. at 746. These
problems were remedied by statutes requiring electric utilities to purchase power from and interconnect with QFs. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (1988). Purchase rate calculations were also specified. 18
C.F.R. § 292.304 (1988). Electric utilities were required to sell to QFs. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (1988).
Finally, exceptions to certain federal and state regulations required of electric utilities were mandated. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.601-.602 (1988).
5. "The purpose of this document is to clarify our view . . . in an apparently ambiguous
statutory enforcement scheme .... " Policy Statement Regarding the Commission's Enforcement
Role Under Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 23 F.E.R.C. 61,304,
at 61,643 (1983).
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attempts to interpret the ambiguities of Section 210 as well as other re-

lated sections of PURPA6 and the Federal Power Act (FPA).7 Until

recently, proponents of the QF industry have unsuccessfully argued that

according to section 2108 transmission access is not only essential to preserve competition, but necessary to satisfy the stated purpose of Section
210.' In response, Congress has recently recognized the need for in-

creased transmission access by QFs in the Energy Policy Act of 1992
which treats QFs more like utilities. 10
This note will examine the difficulties of applying PURPA section
210 in the post merger dynamic. Opinions arising out of the Utah Power
& Light merger with Pacific Power & Electric" will serve as primary

examples of the tension between the electric utility market and the special role QFs were intended to play. Cost issues will be applied to shed

some light on possible competitive effects non-native wheeling will have
on the QF. A model depicting the possible microeconomic effects of
supra-native wheeling will be offered. The model will attempt to offer

solutions to the Commission's initial problems with the mandate of section 210, namely competition and costs. Finally, a logical extension of
QF treatment will be examined including the cost reducing effects of the
more permissive wheeling scheme in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
II.

TRANSMISSION ACCESS

Transmission access nourishes the QF industry. QFs favor liberal
transmission schemes, which broaden potential markets. Electric utilities, on the other hand, regard QF transmission access as a bothersome
6. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Entergy Serv., Inc.
60 F.E.R.C. 61,168 (1992); Beaver Mich. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 59 F.E.R.C. 1 62,062 (1992);
Opinion No. 318, Utah Power & Light, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095 (1988).
7. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-825(c) (1988).
8. "Section 210 of PURPA was designed to encourage the development of cogeneration and
small power production facilities." American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
461 U.S. 402, 404-05 (1983) (footnote omitted).
9. The access issue is increasingly important because of difficulties in siting QFs; this is a
disincentive because QFs may not build where they would have difficulty obtaining a wheeling order
to sell its power to an agreeable utility. See Challengerson QFAccess Assert Key Errorby FERC in
InterpretingPURPA, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 27, 1992, at 9.
10. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915 (1992).
11. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Utah Power & Light
Co., 59 F.E.R.C. 1 61,035 (1992); 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363 (1991); 52 F.E.R.C. 1 61,002 (1990); 51
F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990); Opinion No. 318-B, 48 F.E.R.C. 61,035 (1989); Opinion No. 318-A, 47
F.E.R.C. S 61,209 (1989); Opinion No. 318, 45 F.E.R.C. T 61,095 (1988); 43 F.E.R.C. 63,030
(1988); 41 F.E.R.C. 1 61,283 (1987).
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regulation. The Commission views the QF as the durian of electric transmission schemes, sweet to the goal of a diversified energy mix yet the
complexities of such a scheme are malodorous.
The primary opinion addressing these issues came out of the Utah
Power & Light / Pacific Power & Electric Merger, Opinion 318.12 The
first federal case arising out of this PacifiCorp saga questioned the Commission's logic in excluding QFs from wider transmission access. Despite a federal court recommendation, the Commission retreated to their
original arguments.
A.

Transmission Competitive Effects Identified by Opinion No. 318
and Questioned in Environmental Action

In Opinion No. 31813 the Commission identified two principal dangers of the merger between Utah Power & Light and Pacific Corporation
of Maine. "First, by refusing to wheel low-cost power ... the merged
company could [broker power and] extract monopoly profits" by selling
to third parties. 4 "Second, the merged company could give preference
to its own generation over that of competitors for sales into southwestern
markets,"1 5 thus acting as a vertically integrated monopolist controlling
transmission, principal, and alternate generation. The Commission imposed conditions on the merger in order to avoid the monopoly and monopsony problems: 1) PacifiCorp' 6 would provide firm17 wholesale power
to any requesting "utility,"'" 2) a five year reservation of transmission
capacity would be imposed for transmission dependent utilities (TDUs)
existing at the date of the merger, and 3) if PacifiCorp was to provide
non-firm power, it would be based on an equal three-way sharing of any
savings.' 9
12. 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095.
13. Id. at 61,288.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. PacifiCorp was the post merger entity.
17. Opinion No. 57, Florida Power & Light Co., 8 F.E.R.C. 61,121, at 61,454 (1979) ("[F]irm
services are non-interruptible; priced on the basis of average system costs; designed to meet a customer's base, intermediate and/or peak load requirements; and continuously available over the indefinite future." Id.).
18. QFs are not considered utilities; this exclusion became a pivotal issue in subsequent cases.
See 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209, at 61,739.
19. Opinion No. 318, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,298 (in three-way sharing among the selling,
buying and wheeling parties, "[e]ach party ... shall agree to make available to the other parties such
incremental cost information as is reasonably necessary to estimate the total savings to be shared."
Id. at 61,295.).
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B. Exclusion of QFsfrom TransmissionAccess
The Commission declined to drop QFs from the groups entitled to
wholesale transmission access because QFs can force local utilities to
purchase power.20 However, QFs can have transmission access outside
the local transmission area by negotiating with non-native utilities 2' for
the sale of their excess capacity.22 Unwarranted competitive advantage
would be given to the QFs if mandatory wheeling to non-native utilities
was a condition of the merger.23 The request by interveners for
mandatory wheeling was not that outlandish; the FERC has waived certain types of transmission requirements upon request.24 The wheeling
issue lingered with the first federal case arising out of the PacifiCorp
saga. In EnvironmentalAction, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Commission offered an inadequate explanation for denying QFs
mandatory wheeling access.2"
C. Environmental Action on Remand
After another look at EnvironmentalAction, the Commission reaffirmed its denial of mandatory wheeling access for QFs. The Commission offered three reasons for denying QFs access: 1) the legislative intent
in PURPA purposefully excluded QFs from those that could obtain involuntary wheeling, 26 2) under the statutory framework (favorable to
QFs) there can be no anti-competitive effects or undue discrimination to
QFs in barring them from the transmission, 27 and 3) there is no evidence
that mandatory wheeling of QF power is necessary to maintain adequate
service or coordination.

28

In a vigorous dissent Commissioner Moler attacked each one of the
majority's points.29 Moreover, she argued that the Commission had gone
full circle in explaining its exclusion of QFs as "utilities" regarding transmission access; the new arguments presented did not offer clarifications
20. 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209, at 61,739-40 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (1988)).
21. Id. at 61,739.
22. The motivation for the remote utility to purchase such capacity at the statutorily avoided
cost may be nonexistent.
23. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating the
purpose of antitrust policy as "'the protection of competition, not competitors.'" (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).
24. Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 1986),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 1538 (1lth Cir. 1988).
25. EnvironmentalAction, 939 F.2d at 1065.
26. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,188-89.
27. Id. at 62,190-91.
28. Id. at 62,191.
29. Id. at 62,197-98.
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beyond those given in Opinion 318.30 Much of the circuity of the argument springs from the dichotomous idea of QFs as competitors.
On further consideration, the Commission recognized that Congress
31
gave QFs special privileges as well as limitations under PURPA.
Under section 210 of PURPA, Congress gave QFs the right to seek interconnection.32 However, only electric utilities are given the right to
33
wheeling orders under section 21 1.
Various interveners, as well as a Commission member, maintained
that the legislative history could support either view of QF transmission
access. 34 The FERC's broad mandate31 should favor permissive wheeling to preserve competition when merged entities control access. Supranative wheeling access should be based on economic efficiency in keeping
with the stated purpose of section 210. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 is
sensitive to such efficiency issues and has embraced certain market principles in the QF industry. 36 The Commission is seeking to streamline
and reduce regulatory burdens on the electric utility and QF industries.37
Judgments of economic efficiency may resolve the "to compete or not to
compete" quandary in which QFs find themselves.

III.

QUALIFYING FACILITIES AND COMPETITION

Legislative, judicial and administrative definitions of competition
vary widely. QFs are not true competitors in the electric utility industry,
yet, they must struggle to make their statutorily created market niche
worth their while. Since the identity of "anti-competitive effects" is illusive, a focus on the "encouragement of cogeneration" language of
PURPA will light the path to solving the QF access issue.
A.

QF Exclusion was a Reasonable Interpretation
The Commission has consistently held that QFs are separate from

30. Id.
31. 59 F.E.R.C. 61,035, at 61,114.
32. Id. ("[Tihe Commission's rules implementing section 210 of PURPA state that, if a QF
agrees, the utility receiving the QF's power 'may transmit the energy or capacity to any other electric
utility.'" (quoting Order No. 69, Small Power Production And Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations
Implementing Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed. Reg.
12,214, at 12,235 (1980))).
33. Id.
34. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,197-98.
35. See supra note 2.
36. Supra note 10, 2776 Stat. at 2911.
37. Streamlining of Regulations Pertaining to Parts II and III of the Federal Power Act and the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 57 Fed. Reg. 55176 (1992) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. Parts 2, 34, 35, 41, 131, 292, 294, 382, and 385).
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electric utilities and, therefore, should be excluded from mandatory
wheeling.3" The Commission has also maintained that where ambiguities
exist or when legislative history is illusive, the statutory interpretation
need only be reasonable with a plain reading of the statute.3 9 In applying
this reasoning, a plain reading of the statute reveals that electric utilities
are mentioned separately from QFs; section 210(a) grants the Commission the duty to promote cogeneration and small power production:
[T]he Commission shall prescribe, and from time to time thereafter
revise, such rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration
and small power production.., which rules require electric utilities to
offer to(1) sell electric energy to qualifying cogeneration facilities and
qualifying small power production facilities and
(2) purchase electric energy from such facilities (emphasis
added).4
Thus, the plain reading of the statute separates the QF from the electric
utility. Furthermore, throughout PURPA and the FPA, a reasonable
intrepretation leads to the conclusion that electric utility denotes a separate entity from QFs. This argument resulted in duel legislative histories
throughout the merger application litigation.4 1 Also, the broad "revise"
and "encourage cogeneration" language found throughout PURPA indicates that the statute discourages cogeneration in the post merger system.
While the FERC's application of the statutory framework reasonably interprets the plain meaning of the statutory language, the broadness of the Commission's duties4 2 necessitates greater latitude in
statutory interpretation. The FERC should integrate the fundamental
goal of section 210 into future decisions. That goal is the promotion of
cogeneration and small power production.
B.

Exclusion of QFs: Apparent Conflicts in Section 210

The Commission asserted that no evidence of anti-competitive effects of the PacifiCorp merger adversely effecting the QFs could be
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

59 F.E.R.C. 1 61,035, at 61,117 (interpreting § 211 of the Federal Power Act of 1935).
Id.
PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (footnote omitted).
See generally supra note 11.
See PURPA § 210, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.
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shown.4 3 However, the Commission has revealed legislative history saying Congress sought to insulate' QFs from competition. a5 The Commission further confuses the analysis by treating QFs as competitive entities
while simultaneously insulating them from competition. Fortunately,
Congress has resolved this problem in the new energy act by liberalizing
transmission access for QFs while permitting utility ownership of QFs.4 6
Liberal use of the language may also have contributed to the confusion. 7 Given the broad mandate of section 210 of PURPA, the FERC
can conceivably allow supra-native wheeling and still fall within the statutory framework. At least one court has explained that the full-avoided
cost guarantees the QF a competitive market price.4 8 The same court
goes on to say QFs do not compete with public utilities.4 9 The premise is
defective since prices tend to be dynamic in both the long and shortterms. 50 Furthermore, competitive markets generally promote a downward pressure on costs. Thus, to guarantee a "competitive" cost one
must understand that the cost variable is not static.
The next logical step the Commission must take to clarify the mandate of section 210 as intending to "encourage cogeneration and small
power production" 5 1 would be to introduce true competitive elements to
the electric utility generation industry. Typically, competition best
serves the consumer.12 Since electricity generation is a natural monopoly
and can never embrace a true market without threatening "just and reasonable" and nondiscriminatory rates while guaranteeing constant supply, the introduction of market forces to the QF industry must be
conducted carefully. 3
The EnvironmentalAction court expressed concern that the Commission's exclusion focused on the interests of competitors and should
43. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,190.
44. Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 1986),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988).
45. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,190.
46. See generally supra note 10.
47. Compare FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982) (imprudently using the term
"qualifying utility") with Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2776,
2915 (1992) (proposing an amendment to § 211 of the FPA to omit "qualifying small power producer" and insert "or any other person generating electric energy for sale for resale.").
48. Greensboro Lumber Co., 643 F. Supp. at 1373.
49. Id.
50. CHARLES

F.

PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 423-425, (Public

Utilities Reports 1988).
51. PURPA § 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1988).
52. Environmental Action Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also ADAM
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 159 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1776).
53. See generally Megan A. Wallace, A Negotiated Alternative to Mandatory Wheeling, 10 ENERGY L.J. 99 (1989).
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have focused on consumer interests. 54 The Commission responded that
regulatory commissions can only protect electric consumers within the
statutory framework."5 The courts may resolve this deadlock by balancing the needs of the consumers and the QF. Both parties may be better
off in a truer "market."
IV.

MANDATORY MARKETS FOR

QFs: A

REMEDY

The QFs are armed with options to gain wider transmission access
but these options tend not to encourage cogeneration and small power
production. Manipulating these options creatively is still a solution to
gaining wider access should the Energy Policy Act of 1992 fail to work.
A long-run marginal cost analysis may be the best argument in a permissive wheeling scheme for QFs.
A.

Voluntary Wheeling: Costs, Rates and Consumers.

With voluntary wheeling, the QF is at the mercy of the electric utility. The "market"5 6 is created by electricity consumers in search of the
lowest priced source. The current regime does not facilitate voluntary
wheeling. 7 A partial market mechanism is present when QFs seek voluntary wheeling, giving all producers wider transmission access.5 8 The
market is "partial" in that the electric utilities have superior bargaining
power; they alone are the market makers. In the monopsonistic tradition
the single buyer of QF capacity is the native utility; 9 QFs thus have a
"mandatory market." This is not a true anticompetitive remedy in that
the electric utilities virtually create their own demand for low cost
power. The motivation to seek out low cost power may not be present in
the utilities' rate structure.
Rates are the product of a bargaining process; eventually this process determines the rate structurel ° which exists within a "zone of reasonableness." 61 Section 210 of PURPA requires the FERC to
9462
Teecnue
consider" potential
savings for utility consumers.
These consumer
savings may be used to form a basis for allowing QF wholesale wheeling
54. Environmental Action, 939 F.2d at 1061.
55. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,199.
56. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a), (d) (1992) (explaining that the "market" for the QF is the
interconnected utility or voluntarily wheeling utility).
57. Wallace, supra note 53, at 100.
58. See Wallace, supra note 53.
59. 45 F.E.R.C. q 61,095, at 61,290.
60. DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 272 (MIT Press 1989).
61. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968).
62. American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 411 (1983).
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outside the QF's native region. Arguments for a rate increase would be
weak in an environment of low-cost production encouragement.
Cost-based pricing 63 is often controversial and, at times, the Commission may accept "second best efficiency" which allows consumer surplus and the profits of regulated firms to adjust rates.6 However, QFs
are guaranteed the "full-avoided cost."' 65 The full-avoided cost rule is
one of the elements which insulates QFs from competition. 66 The Commission has noted several cost distortions likely to impact a mandatory
access regime. 67
The Commission states that unconditioned transmission access for
QFs would exacerbate potential problems in administratively determined
avoided costs.68 Not only is the administratively determined cost a problem, but the interstate differential prices can pose additional problems.69
Therefore, any integrated wheeling system requires a standard calcula70
tion for avoided costs.
B.

Transmission Access as an Anticompetitive Tool: Managing
Interests

Using section 203 of PURPA, the Commission may provide QFs
with transmission access upon request. 7 1 The FERC will grant access
where the public interest is affected and a remedy is needed to counteract
the anticompetitive effects of a merger.72 In Utah Power & Light, the
Commission found no need for a QF wheeling order.73 However, in
Opinion 318, the Commission stated that "the proposed merger is likely
to result in a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant product
and geographic markets"'74 and "the merger as proposed is not consistent
63. SPULBER, supra note 60, at 274 (The firm's fixed and variable costs are estimated by the
formula: Total Cost = Variable Cost + Rate of Return X Rate Base).
64. Id.
65. American PaperInst., 402 U.S. at 406 ("permitting a utility to obtain energy at a cost less
than the cost to the utility of producing the energy itself or purchasing it from an alternative
source." Id.).
66. See Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345, 1373 (N.D. Ga.
1986), aff'd, 844 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988).
67. Id.
68. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,191.
69. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 470 U.S. 1075, 1078 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting).
70. The determination of such rates is a controversial proposition and will not be addressed at
length here.
71. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,190.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,284 (footnote omitted).
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with the public interest.

'75

The Commission then went on to condition

the merger. This apparently inconsistent language is relied on by the
dissent in the remanded decision requested by the EnvironmentalAction
7 6

court.

An example of clearly anticompetitive effects was present in the
Southern California Edison (Edison) / San Diego Gas and Electric
(SDG&E) proposed merger.77 An unregulated QF affiliate of Edison,
Mission Energy, alleged sold its power at inflated prices to the parent
company. The court found that such self-dealing was used to evade rate
regulation. 78 The administrative law judge found that the required conditions would increase societal costs, therefore, the merger application
was denied.79 The societal or consumer nexus was established with the
increased monopoly power the merger would give Edison."°
C. Reduction of Merger Activity and Competition

The Mission Energy self-dealing scenario was not present in the
PacifiCorp merger.8 " However, an independent type of market pressure
may effectively lead to an anticompetitive atmosphere. The American
electrical utility industry has been approaching a merger ceiling because
increasingly fewer utility mergers are possible, 2 and the industry is having difficulty in siting new QFs. 3 Therefore, existing facilities are being
forced to increase their capacity. The problem of losing QF status rears
its head should capacity grow over 80 MW. 4 The Commission's interpretation of competition in the Utah Power & Light saga8 5 shows that
QFs will have limited success in showing competitive harm in a section
203 application. The Commission will allow a QF to wheel to distant
utilities if it waives mandatory wheeling purchase rights.8 6
Before the Energy Policy Act of 1992, QFs were caught in a conundrum because the two available alternatives conflicted with the mandate
75. Id. at 61,289.
76. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,196-97; see supra note 19.
77. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 47 F.E.R.C. 61,196, at 61,666 (1989).
78. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 63,014, at 65,109-10 (1990).
79. Id. at 65,147.
80. See 53 F.E.R.C. t 63,014; 47 F.E.R.C. 61,196.
81. See generally 57 F.E.R.C. %61,363.
82. See Leonard W. Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 135, 165-67 (Almarin Phillips ed., 1975).
83. Challengers on QF Access Assert Key Errorby FERC in Interpreting PURPA, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., Jan. 27, 1992, at 9-10.
84. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203 (1992).
85. See supra note 11.
86. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,186 n.18.
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of section 210. Problems with siting lead existing QFs to increase capacity, but exceeding the 80 MW could cost the firm QF status. On the
other hand they could waive QF status and get greater transmission ac-

cess. Unfortunately, both of these scenarios develop an electric utility
market, not a QF or cogenerator market.
Today, QFs may be more successful in requesting that the Commis-

sion accept wheeling applications in order to meet the mandate of section
21087 and the liberalized transmission scheme"8 because cogeneration

and small power production is not encouraged if no real markets exist for
wholesale transmission. 9 The antitrust concerns expressed in Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC90 are best met by greater QF access to
transmission. Simply put, the incentive of greater return for cogenerators is needed in order to promote cogeneration and small power
production.

D. Full-Avoided Cost,91 Minimum Rates: Making A Truer QF Market
via Permissive Wheeling

Wheeling across state lines causes a problem with full-avoided cost
calculation. According to section 210(b), the rates for QF purchases
must be "just and reasonable," nondiscriminatory, and that no FERC

rule "shall provide for a rate which exceeds the incremental cost to the
electric utility of alternative electric energy." 92 States that set minimum
rates for purchases from QFs create a problem when minimum rates exceed full-avoided costs. Eleven states set minimum costs at rates higher
than the full-avoided cost rate.93 In ConsolidatedEdison, Justice White's
dissent indicated favorable state-determined rates were within the section
87. See supra note 2.
88. Supra note 10.
89. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,184. Potential market distortions may exist in avoided cost
calculations; states differ in avoided cost calculation.
90. 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
91. FERC promulgated a rule requiring "electric utilities to purchase electric energy from
cogenerators and small power producers at a rate equal to the purchasing utility's full avoided cost,
i.e., the cost the utility would have incurred had it generated the electricity itself or purchased the
electricity from another source." American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.
461 U.S. 402, 404 (1983).
The calculation of full-avoided cost is controversial, especially when calculating long-run versus
short-run and embedded versus future costs. These issues will not be addressed in this note. For an
eloquent introduction to this area see Wallace, supra note 53. For an analysis of PURPA § 210
incremental marginal cost and "just and reasonable" pricing see Stephen R. Miles, Comment, Full
Avoided Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: "Just and Reasonable" To
Electric Consumers?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267 (1984).
92. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 470 U.S. 1075, 1076 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting PURPA § 210(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3).
93. 1d. at 1078.
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210 powers delegated to the states in PURPA9 4 . Congress did not give
the FERC the power to exempt QFs from state laws or regulations. 95
State-determined minimum rates over the full-avoided cost are effectively a QF subsidy, a veritable boon for QFs in a mandatory wheeling
scheme. However, the QFs would be subject to the state laws. 96 It is
likely that minimum rate structures such as New York's 97 will be the
target of a mandatory QF wheeling9" scheme because state laws set minimum rates, which may exceed the section 210 requisite full-avoided cost.
Such minimum rate setting laws may skew the effectiveness of a broader
QF wheeling regime.
The full-avoided cost can be a strong incentive for cogeneration and
small power production, provided the local utility has marginal costs9 9
that are rising and above those of the cogenerator or the small power
producer, i.e., the small power producer is more efficient than the
purchasing utility. However, if a QF's native utility is a very efficient
producer and its marginal costs are diminishing, the QF can enjoy a
guaranteed market but few other encouragements.
An illustration of a "competitively neutral"" application of QF
wheeling is seen below. This model assumes that marginal costs are set
in the long-run, QF's marginal cost curve is stable, full-avoided cost calculations are standard, and that market distorting effects of minimum

rate setting are nominal. If a utility's marginal cost curve is designated
by U-U, and the QF's marginal cost curve is represented by QF-QF,10 '

then the economically efficient full-avoided cost will be the area under
94. Id.; contra Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 676 P.2d 764 (Kan.
1984).
95. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982).
96. Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345, 1384 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
97. ConsolidatedEdison Co., 470 U.S. at 1076 (White, J.,
dissenting).
98. The physical limits on transmission costs are largely a function of physics. Transmission
costs "vary approximately in proportion to distance and inversely with the square of transmission
voltages." Leonard W. Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 136 (Almarin Phillips ed., 1975). Therefore, the possible QF mar-

ket is limited by the physical boundaries of transmission; these limits restrict the QF's "market
power," a concern addressed in Opinion No. 318, 45 F.E.R.C. 1 61,095 (1988).
99. Marginal costs are the "next unit" of production costs, these costs generally decrease because of economies of scale; however, in the long run the next unit of power production will experience diminishing returns in the form of greater costs realized with additional capacity. Therefore,
the long-run marginal cost curve is "U" shaped. For an in depth analysis see CHARLES F. PHILLIPS,
JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 423-425, (Public Utilities Reports 1988).

100. Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Util. Co., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,204, at 61,537 (1983),
aff'd, Opinion No. 198-A, 26 F.E.R.C. 61,127 (1984).
101. The QF's curve is smaller primarily because by statute a QF is a smaller power generator
(80 MW). See Third Imperial Geothermal Co., 36 F.E.R.C. 161,013, at 61,034 (1986). Also, marginal costs will rise as with any long-term marginal cost curve. The curves illustrated are approximate. For an exacting mathematical plot of such curves see SPULBER, supra note 60.
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the U-(Q,,P )-QF curve (fig. 1). Should the QF be allowed to apply for a
wheeling order, it is likely to "shop" for the utility with the steeper marginal cost curve in order to extract the statutorily guaranteed higher fullavoided or incremental cost differential. Inefficient utilities, those with
higher costs, will become targets for QF's with permissive wheeling.
Over time the "target" utility will be under pressure to flatten or shift its
marginal utility curve by more efficient generation (fig. 2). The target
utility most likely will not want to pay out the full-avoided cost to the
distant QF, especially if the utility is privately held and subject to shareholder pressure. By minimizing its marginal costs, the utility pays out a
smaller full-avoided cost. The introduction of this market mechanism
may increase efficiency over the long-term by reducing costs, effectively
causing a shift in the utility's marginal cost curve to U-U 02 (fig.2). The
shifting curve is likely to reduce rates in the long-run provided the QFs
marginal cost curve remains stable (QF-QF).
At this point in the model the QF is presented with two options.
The QF may reapply to target the next less efficient producer once the
current wheeling agreement has terminated. Alternatively, the QF may
continue the present interconnection. As a result, "considerations" 10 3 to
102. See generally SPULBER, supra note 60, at 143-147.

103. See Wallace, supra note 53, at 100.
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promote potential consumer savings may be seen; at the very least cost
efficiency is promoted.
This market illustration can be argued as leaving PURPA "competitively neutral" because it preserves the mandate of section 210,' 04 insulates QFs from true competition, 10 5 and is non-discriminatory.106 This
proposed transmission access should not be unconditional, which is a
concern of the Commission." 7 A showing of the target utilities' high
marginal costs along with the QFs relative efficiency would have to be
made in the application process.'08 This process may be similar to a rate
hearing. Wheeling rates must be based on a system that promotes efficient use of permissive wheeling for utilities.109 Therefore, a schematic
can be developed which would address the concerns of the Commission
while creating a truer "market" to encourage cogeneration and small
power production in accordance with section 210. It is possible for the
FERC to permit a QF wheeling system which counteracts the anticompetitive effects of the merger."' Permissive wheeling is likely to be the
major encouragement for future cogeneration and small power
production.
The Commission recognizes two options for QFs that want wheeling: 1) QFs may retain their QF status and seek voluntary transmission
from receptive utilities, or 2) QFs may waive their PURPA rights by
electing to be an electric utility and thereby obtain the ability to seek
involuntary wheeling under the Federal Power Act. I The Commission
has recognized the Congressional intent which gave the Commission a
significant role in developing the QF industry." 2 It can satisfy this role
by rulemaking as it has in the present case."' In fact, the Commission
may exempt certain facilities from all or part of the FPA, the Public
Utility Holding Company Act and relevant state laws." 4 The FERC
could conceivably establish such a permissive QF wheeling regime. No
104. See supra note 8.
105. See 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,190.
106. See id. at 62,191.
107. Id.
108. Transmission costs must be figured in as well. See generally Wallace, supra note 53.
109. See also Wallace, supra note 53, at 100.
110. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,186.
111. Id. at 62,189.
112. Id. at 62,187.
113. See, eg., Streamlining of Regulations Pertaining to Parts II and III of the Federal Power
Act and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 57 Fed. Reg. 55,176 (1992) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. Parts 2, 34, 35, 41, 131, 292, 294, 382, and 385).
114. 57 F.E.R.C. 61,363, at 62,187 n.26; PURPA § 210(e), 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(e)(1) (1988).
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industry can be promoted without a sustainable market; the QF industry
is no exception.
IV.

CONCLUSION

New anticompetitive or, more accurately, anti-market trends face
the QF industry. Difficulties in siting new facilities and a monopsonistic
market may lead to a slowdown in cogeneration and small power production. Congress has recognized this difficulty and has passed new legislation which seeks to permit greater transmission access.
The Commission's exclusion of QFs access is a reasonable reading of
the relevant statutory framework. However, the Commission could still
be within its broad section 210 mandate if it allows a permissive QF
wheeling market to exist, more so now because appropriate legislation
has been passed. The FERC's discretion is permitted in the statutory
framework.
Consumer savings can form an alternative basis for a permissive
non-native wheeling scheme. The permissive wheeling scheme requires a
showing of efficient generation and transmission in the QF and a high
marginal cost in the "target" utility using a standardized full-avoided
cost calculation. In the long-term, the "target" utility will be under pressure to reduce its marginal costs in order to lessen the required fullavoided cost pay-out. However, states which set minimum rates may
distort such results.
With the changes in the QF market, the Commission may focus on
introducing vital competition into the electric utility industry by allowing
cogenerators greater transmission access. By doing so the FERC will
fullfill its broad mandate from section 210, that is, to develop the
cogeneration and small power production industry.
Martin F. Medeiros
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